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Abstract 
 
This paper examines Japan’s foreign aid sanction policy toward China. The Japanese 
government seems to be reluctant to take strict measures against China. Only due to 
strong criticisms from other aid donors did Japan cut aid to China. However, economic 
assistance was resumed as soon as Japan found a suitable pretext. What were the 
rationales for Japan’s policies in the country? What were the main factors that prevented 
Tokyo from taking strict measures against the country? This paper assumes that the 
driving force behind Japan’s aid policy is the promotion of Japan’s economic interests. 
As a conclusion, Japan has very strong economic and diplomatic relations with China. 
The need to maintain good relations with them became the main factor that determined 
Japan’s response to the human rights issues in the country. In other words, oftentimes, 
economic and diplomatic interests have prevented Japan from using stern foreign aid 
sanctions against China.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper will examine Japan’s foreign aid sanction policy toward China. The Japanese 
government seems to be reluctant to take strict measures against China. Only due to 
strong criticisms from other aid donors did Japan cut aid to China. However, economic 
assistance tends to be resumed as soon as Japan found a suitable pretext.1 What were the 
rationales for Japan’s policies in the country? What were the main factors that prevented 
Tokyo from taking strict measures against the country? 
 
This paper assumes that the real driving force behind Japan’s aid sanctions policy is the 
promotion of Japan’s economic interests. This means that the Japanese government 
would take into account economic relations between Japan and the recipient country (i.e. 
China) when deliberating the introduction of aid sanctions against the recipient.  
 
In other words, there would be a difference in the application of Japanese aid sanctions to 
those countries that Japan has strong economic relations with to those countries that have 
weaker ties with Japan. 2  Therefore, before further discussing Japanese aid sanctions 
episodes in China, the following section will briefly analyse Japan’s economic relations 
with Asian countries. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Other controversial cases -- Burma and Cambodia -- are reviewed in Oishi and Furuoka (2003).  
2 For example, developing countries in Latin America and Africa could be considered as the recipient 
countries that Japan has relatively weaker economic ties. Detailed description of Japan’s aid sanctions 
policy toward Latin America, see Furuoka (2007a). Also, see Furuoka (2007b) for the description of 
Japan’s aid sanctions policy toward Africa. On the other hand, developing countries in Asia, such as 
Indonesia and Thailand, could be considered as the recipient countries that Japan has relatively stronger 
economic ties. See Furuoka (2007c) for the detailed account of Japan’s aid sanctions policy toward 
Indonesia and Thailand   
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2. Japan’s Economic Interests and Foreign Aid Policy   
Asian countries are important trade partner of Japan and main recipient countries of 
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). According to Furuoka (2007a), in term of 
international trade, Asia has been important destination for Japanese exports. In 1997, 
Japanese exports to Asia amounted to US$ 177 billion while it increased to US$ 277 
billion in 2004.   
 
Comparison with Asian countries, Latin American countries and African countries are 
relatively minor trade partner. In 2004, Japanese exports to Latin America amounted to 
US$ 21 billion while Japanese exports to Africa accounted for less than US$ 10 billion 
(Furuoka, 2007a).  
 
In 2005, Japan is one of very important trade partners of China. Japanese exports to 
China amounted to US$ 100 billion which accounted for approximately 15 percent of 
China’s total imports. On the other hand, Chinese exports to Japan amounted to US$ 84 
billion which accounted for approximately 11 percent of China’s total exports (Asian 
Development Bank, 2007).   
 
Asia has been the major recipient of Japanese FDI since the 1980s (see Table 1). During 
the second half of the 1990s, Asia was the major recipient of Japanese investment; the 
area received US$12 billion of Japanese investment in 1995, US$11 billion in 1996, and 
US$12 billion in 1997.  
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Table 1   Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries by Area 
                  (US$ million) 
 
Region \ Year 1981-1994 1995 1996 1997 2004 
Asia 66,517 12,264 11,614 12,181 9,388 
Latin America 49,917 3,877 4,446 6,336 6,371 
Africa 7,351 379 431 240 115 
 
Source: Furuoka (2006) 
 
Although Latin American countries were getting more of Japanese FDI, which surpassed 
US$ 6 billion in 2004, amount of Japanese investment in Asia was approximately 50 
percent higher than in Latin America. African countries remain minor recipients of JDI 
since the 1980s. 
 
According to Ministry of Finance (2005), Japan, China is one of very important 
recipients of Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2004, China received 490 
billion Japanese Yen (approximately US$ 4.5 billion) as Japanese FDI which accounted 
for approximately 12 percent of Japanese FDI in 2004.  
 
As seen in Table 2, major recipients of Japanese foreign aid are also Japan’s major trade 
partners. All of the top five recipient countries of Japan’s ODA - China, Indonesia, India, 
Vietnam and, the Philippines and - are among Japan’s top ten trade partners. Although 
Azerbaijan is not Japan’s major trade partner, Azerbaijan seems to be economically 
important for Japan because Azerbaijan’s petroleum could become an alternative of 
Middle-Eastern petroleum.     
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As data reveals, there are no major recipients of Japanese foreign aid in Africa where 
many countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, face serious economic problems and 
urgently require foreign aid.  
 
Table 2   Major Recipients of Japanese Bilateral Aid and Japan’s Major  
               Trade Partners 
 
Top ten recipients of Japanese 
bilateral aid (2002) 
Japan’s top ten trade partners among 
developing countries, and their share 
of Japan’s exports (2001) 
Name of 
Country 
Percentage Name of Country Percentage 
1.China 12.32 1.China 7.7 
2.Indonesia 8.00 2.Thailand 3.0 
3. India 7.34 3.Malaysia  2.7 
4.Vietman 5.57 4.The Philippines 2.0 
5.The 
Philippines 
4.73 5.Indonesia 1.60 
6.Pakistan 4.48 6.Panama  1.2 
7.Thailand 3.31 7.Mexico 1.0 
8.Azerbaijan 2.11 8.Brazil 0.6 
9.Bangladesh 1.82 9.India 0.5 
10.Peru 1.78 10.Vietnam 0.3 
 
Source: data on bilateral aid are from the MOFA (2005) 
            data on exports are from JETRO (2001) 
 
These findings seem to indicate that the Japanese government continues giving bigger 
amounts of ODA to the major trade partners. In other word, the developing countries that 
have stronger economic relations with Japan would receive more Japanese aid.  
 
More importantly, it should be noted that China is the top recipient country of Japan’s 
foreign aid. At same time, China is Japan’s top trade partner among the developing 
countries. Because of this Japanese government may be more concerned about hurting 
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Japan’s interest by imposing aid sanctions against a important trade partner, China.  
Moreover, the Japanese government tends to give priority to Asia in its foreign policy.3 
According to Edward Lincoln (1993: 168), a leading Japanese newspaper claimed, “The 
end of the cold war opened the way for Japan to pursue an independent foreign policy 
(using foreign aid as a key element) focused primarily on Asia”. 
 
There are two reasons why policymaker in Japanese foreign policy pays special attention 
to Asia. First, the Japanese identify themselves as Asian. As Ishizuka put it, “The 
Japanese people understandably are inclined to identify themselves with Asia. This is 
only natural” (Far Eastern Economic Review, December 16, 1993: 24).        
.  
The other reason is “Japan bashing” by the US. American companies often accuse Japan 
of being an “unfair” country and ask her to open the domestic market. Ishizuka asserts, 
“These increasing clashes over economic and political issues have led some (Japanese) to 
see Asianism as Japan’s best answer” (Far Eastern Economic Review, December 16, 
1993: 24).        
 
To sum up, Japan has stronger economic and diplomatic relations with developing 
countries in Asia, especially with China, than with other developing countries in Latin 
America or Africa countries. As a consequence, Japan’s economic interests may 
influence Japan’s aid sanctions policy toward China. More precisely, Japan may take 
lenient measures toward China while imposing strict aid sanctions against recipient 
                                                 
3 Detailed discussion on Japan’s Asia policy, see Furuoka (2002). 
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countries which has relative economic and diplomatic ties.4
 
3. Japan’s Aid Sanctions Policy Toward China 
a) Background 
Relations between Japan and China go back to the prehistoric period. Until recently, 
China has been one of Japan’s most important economic and diplomatic partners. 
According to Japan’s ODA 1997, China became the second largest recipient of Japan’s 
bilateral aid in 1995. The Japanese government gives several reasons why so much of 
Japan’s aid is allocated to China (MOFA, 1997a).  
 
First, due to geographical proximity, China and Japan have strong political, historical and 
cultural ties. Second, maintaining and advancing stable and friendly relations between the 
two countries is conducive to peace and stability in Asia and in the world. Third, the 
economic relationship between China and Japan is growing deeper and broader. Fourth, 
China needs substantial funds for the modernisation of its economy. Finally, China, with 
enormous land and population resources, has a great need for foreign aid (MOFA, 1997a: 
194-195).    
   
Orr (1993a: 87) points out that since Japan first gave ODA to China in 1979, Tokyo has 
been providing huge amounts of money to that country. From 1982 to 1986, China was 
the largest recipient of Japanese foreign aid. At that time, the US still considered China a 
                                                 
4 For example, Furuoka (2007b) argued that Japanese government has taken stern actions against African 
countries. Furuoka conclude that Japan has weak economic and diplomatic ties with African countries, 
Because of that the Japanese government is not concerned about hurting Japan’s interest by imposing aid 
sanctions against recipient countries in Africa.  
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member of the Communist bloc and did not give it economic assistance because foreign 
aid to the communist countries had been banned under the US Foreign Aid Act. 
 
The Japanese government set special plans to systematically expand the amount of 
Japan’s ODA to China. Seiichiro Takagi (1995: 100) notes that Japan has been by far the 
most willing provider of foreign aid to China. Japan was the largest aid donor to the 
country through the First and Second Yen Loan Plans.5 During Prime Minister Noboru 
Takeshita’s trip to Beijing in August 1988, the Investment Protection Agreement was 
signed between Japan and China. The Japanese government announced a plan for the 
Third Yen Loan Programme (TYLP) and pledged to distribute US$6 billion in ODA to 
China from FY 1990 to FY 1995.  
 
Regarding the quality of Japanese aid to China, Tokyo still prefers to provide loans rather 
than grants. According to Zhao, a distinct characteristic of Japan’s ODA to China is a 
high concentration of bilateral loans, which account for 85 to 90 percent of the total 
bilateral aid. Zhao (1995: 163) comments, “The primary reason for this type of aid is 
Chinese emphasis on funds for large-scale infrastructure projects, such as railway, ports 
and hydroelectric power. From the Japanese perspective, such large-scale projects 
normally have a high feasibility status and receive better publicity in the international 
community and are therefore more desirable”.  
 
 
                                                 
5 The First Yen Loan Plan (1979-1984) was introduced by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. The Second 
Yen Loan Plan (1985-1990) was approved by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1984.  
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b) Tiananmen Square Incident 
There have been two movements for democracy in China since Deng Xiaoping seized 
control of the Chinese communist party. The first movement called the “Wall of 
Democracy” began in 1979 and consisted of citizens posting their opinions. The second 
movement originated in Anhui Province, where students demanded that provisional 
elections be held through a democratic procedure. Gradually, the movement spread 
nation-wide and led to the dismissal of General Secretary Hu Yaobang in January 
1987(MOFA, 1989a: 130-133). 
 
After Hu’s death in April 1989, the student movement grew into a series of 
demonstrations. The development can be divided into two stages: 1) April 15-May 4, 
1989 when the attitude of restraint on the part of both students and the government 
prevailed, and 2) May 13-June 4, 1989 when demonstrations escalated and ended in 
clashes between the army and the demonstrators (MOFA, 1989a: 130-133). 
 
On May 13, 1989 in protest against the government’s suppression of demonstrations, 
demonstrators began a hunger strike at Tiananmen Square. At that time the world’s 
attention was drawn to China because of Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s visit to the country. The 
demonstrators carried radical slogans that criticised the supreme leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party. In response, on May 20, 1989, the government imposed martial law 
(MOFA, 1989a: 130-133).  
.  
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From midnight of June 3, until the dawn of June 4, martial law troops was said to used 
armed force to remove students and citizens from Tiananmen Square. Hundreds of people 
were said to be killed or to be reported missing during the military operation (MOFA, 
1989a: 130-133).  
 
c) Japan’s Reaction to the Tiananmen Square Incident  
Gaiko Seisho 1989 (Diplomatic Bluebook 1989) gives an outline of the Japanese 
government’s immediate reaction to the events at Tiananmen Square. On the day when 
the incident happened, the MOFA issued a statement saying that the armed suppression 
of demonstrators was a matter of grave concern for the Japanese government (MOFA, 
1989b).  
 
The following day, the Chief Cabinet Secretary expressed regrets over the incident once 
again and on June 7, a Vice-Minister of the MOFA called on the Chinese Ambassador in 
Tokyo and requested that the Chinese government exercise self-control. He also stated 
that the Chinese government’s actions could not be tolerated from a humanitarian 
viewpoint (MOFA, 1989b: 165-166). 
 
Initially, Tokyo did not plan to take punitive measures against China. However, 
according to Arase (1995: 943), “After being pressed by foreign and domestic critics, the 
government froze aid to China, but as a response (to the pressure) and not a sanction”.   
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On June 7, the Japanese government issued travel advice discouraging Japanese citizens 
from travelling to China and recommended that they leave China; this included Japanese 
aid-related staff. The advice was a de facto measure suspending ongoing ODA projects.  
 
On June 20, the MOFA announced a freeze on new ODA projects, including all 
preparatory projects for FY 1990 - FY 1995. However, as Seiichiro Takagi (1995: 101-
102) points out, “Such measures were taken somewhat later and were presented in either 
distinctly apolitical manner or with no clear political explanation”. 
 
Several reasons could be offered for Japan’s non-committal response to the events at 
Tiananmen Square. A specialist on China, Seiichiro Takagi (1995: 102-103) suggests that 
the historical aspect and fear of instability in China determined Japan’s position. First of 
all, Takagi claims, Japan was reluctant to take strict actions against China because 
atrocities committed by the Japanese army in China during World War II were still fresh 
in mind.  
 
Secondly, according to Takagi (1995: 102-103), Tokyo perceived the danger of isolating 
and destabilising China. As he put it, “The Japanese government also feared that 
economic disruption (in China) might lead to political instability, which in turn could 
create instability in Asia and eventually the world. The fear of possible economic 
disruption and political instability in China was linked to the concern that Japan might be 
inundated by Chinese boat people”. 
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A MOFA specialist on China gave a different analysis of Japan’s policy. In his opinion, 
the Japanese government tried not to antagonize China. If Tokyo resorted to stern actions, 
Beijing could have assumed a hard-line stance and refuse any suggestions regarding the 
improvement of the political situation from Japan. On the contrary, if Japan tried to find a 
way to save China’s face (pride), Beijing could be more willing to turn an attentive ear to 
Japan’s advice (Furuoka, 2006: 191). 
 
4. Evaluation 
Japan’s policy toward China after the Tiananmen Square incident offers a classic 
example of Japan’s diplomatic dilemma of choosing between the promotion of “universal 
values” and the pursuit of economic and diplomatic interests. Zhao (1995) argues that 
Japan’s reaction to the Tiananmen incident reflected Tokyo’s two main diplomatic goals: 
1) to be in line with the Western stance by strongly criticising the Chinese government, 
and 2) to ensure that Sino-Japanese relations would not be damaged.  
 
According to Zhao (1995), desire to be in line with the West explains Japan’s decision to 
impose economic sanctions on China, including the aid cut off and the suspension of all 
official meetings. However, at the same time, the MOFA declared that the government 
was interested in maintaining good relations between Japan and China.  
 
Zhao (1995: 67) points out that such a dual position inevitably creates confusion in 
Japan’s policy towards China, “The controversy forced Tokyo to search for a balance 
among various options, while it was trying to conform to both the West and China”. 
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Arase (1993: 944) argues that a powerful politician played an important role in 
facilitating Japan’s aid resumption to China. Arase asserts that in order to handle an 
upcoming G-7 summit and clear the way for Japan’s new aid plan, the Japanese 
government suggested that China make a symbolic concession to the Western donors’ 
demands.  
 
According to Arase (1993), during a powerful Japanese politician’s visit to Beijing in 
May 1990, Watanabe asked for the release of dissident Fang Lizhi. In June 1990, the 
Chinese authorities announced that Fang Lizhi could leave the US embassy in Beijing. 
Arase claims the release of Fang Lizhi made it possible for the Japanese government to 
announce at the Houston G-7 Summit the resumption of Japan’s foreign aid to China as a 
reward for the country’s progress toward democracy.  
 
Tokyo’s course of action toward Beijing was, predictably, dictated by economic and 
diplomatic considerations. Arase (1993: 945) gives the following assessment of Japan’s 
policies in China, “Thus, not only Tokyo acted consistently to shield China from Western 
pressure, but in subtle ways has aided the repressive policies of the regime in Beijing. 
Tokyo is apparently willing to sacrifice democracy and human rights - as well as an 
important part of its moral and political stature - for a more intimate economic and 
political relationship with Beijing”.  
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Figure 1   Japan’s Aid Sanctions Policy toward China 
 
 
To sum up the above, Japan has very strong economic and diplomatic relations with 
China. The need to maintain good relations with them became the main factor that 
determined Japan’s response to the human rights issues in the country. In other words, 
oftentimes, economic and diplomatic interests have prevented Japan from using stern 
foreign aid sanctions against China (see Figure 1). 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines Japan’s foreign aid sanction policy toward China. The Japanese 
government seems to be reluctant to take strict measures against China. Only due to 
strong criticisms from other aid donors did Japan cut aid to China. However, economic 
assistance was resumed as soon as Japan found a suitable pretext.  
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It should be noted that when the Japanese government yields to international pressures 
and imposes aid sanctions on a country that represents considerable economic interests, 
or has special relations with Japan, Tokyo will resume aid as soon as it finds the slightest 
convenient pretext to do so, even if there are no concrete signs of improvement.  
 
For example, in China, Japan suspended foreign aid in 1989 (the human rights index was 
“seven”), but resumed ODA in 1991 (the human rights index remained at “seven”) (see 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Aid Sanctions Against China 
 
Country Year Measures Human 
Rights 
Condition 
Index 
Area 
1. China 1989 Aid suspension 
(Aid resumed in 1991) 
Seven 
(1989) 
Seven 
(1991) 
Asia 
Source: Furuoka (2005) 
Note: Freedom House Index of political rights is used to measure the human rights 
condition in recipient countries. The index uses a one-to-seven scale and assigns higher 
numbers to countries with worse human rights conditions.  
 
As a conclusion, Japan has very strong economic and diplomatic relations with China. 
The need to maintain good relations with them became the main factor that determined 
Japan’s response to the human rights issues in the country. In other words, oftentimes, 
economic and diplomatic interests have prevented Japan from using stern foreign aid 
sanctions against China.  
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